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Abstract
Bidding one’s value in a second-price, private-value auction is a weakly
dominant solution (Vickrey, 1961), but repeated experimental studies find
more overbidding than underbidding. We propose a model of optimistically
irrational bidders who understand that there are possible gains and losses
associated with higher bids but who may overestimate the additional proba-
bility of winning and/or underestimate the potential losses when bidding above
value. These bidders may fail to discover the dominant strategy—despite the
fact that the dominant strategy only requires rationality from bidders—but re-
spond in a common sense way to out-of-equilibrium outcomes. By varying the
monetary consequences of losing money in experimental auctions we observe
more overbidding when the cost to losing money is low, and less overbidding
when the cost is high. Our findings lend themselves to models in which less
than fully rational bidders respond systematically to out-of-equilibrium incen-
tives, and we find that our model better fits the effects of our manipulations
than most of the existing models we consider.
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1 Introduction
In a sealed-bid second-price auction (SPA) with private valuations, where the highest
bidder wins and pays the second highest bid, bidding one’s value is a weakly dom-
inant strategy (WDS, Vickrey 1961). This strategy requires only that each bidder
behave rationally and it is unaffected by the number of rivals or their valuations, a
bidder’s risk preferences, or beliefs regarding rationality of rivals. Repeated experi-
mental studies have found that subjects deviate from the WDS by overbidding much
more than underbidding, resulting in overbidding on average (e.g., Kagel, Harstad
and Levin 1987; Kagel and Levin 1993). By contrast, experimental evidence from
the strategically equivalent ascending English auction demonstrates almost immedi-
ate convergence to the dominant strategy (e.g. Kagel, Harstad, Levin 1987; Kagel
and Levin 1993; Kagel 1995).1 While overbidding relative to the risk-neutral, Nash
equilibrium (RNNE) has also been frequently found in first-price auctions (FPA,
e.g., Kagel 1995 and Kagel and Levin 1993), the “usual suspects,” — risk aversion,
beliefs about others’ play, biases in perceptions of probabilities — that may explain
overbidding in FPAs are of no avail in SPAs.
The contrast between SPAs and English auctions suggests that subjects discover
the WDS in the English auction but not in the SPA; why is this the case? The
cognitive process that leads to the discovery of the WDS in an SPA is far from
trivial and an experimental subject may be unable to recognize it without experience
1Given the differences in the strategy spaces, it is not strictly accurate to say that the two
auction formats have the same dominant strategy because bidders in an SPA are choosing a bid,
where in an English auction they are deciding whether to continue or not at the current price. In
the former, the dominant strategy is to bid one’s value, while in the later the dominant strategy is
to remain in the auction until the price surpasses one’s value.
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or training. In an English auction, on the other hand, a subject needs to answer a
simple question for herself: “Am I ‘in’ or ‘out’?” Answering this question leads a
bidder to drop out at his value.
Subjects who do not bid their value in SPAs are nevertheless still motivated by
common sense economic incentives, such as expected payoffs, though imperfectly.
Kagel, Harstad, and Levin (1987) conjectured that subjects are aware that higher
bidding increases the probability of winning the auctions but underestimate the addi-
tional cost associated with it. Instead of looking for dominant strategies, we suggest
that optimistically irrational bidders are guided by a desire to maximize their profits
combined with an inability to fully grasp the intricacies of the auction environment
that allows them to view the consequences of their actions more favorably. We do this
by modeling reasonable bidders who recognize (i) a higher bid increases the proba-
bility of winning, and (ii) the bidder may understate negative payoffs to higher bids.
These behaviorally plausible assumptions about bidders are the building blocks of
our simple model of how out-of-equilibrium incentives might affect behavior in SPAs.
We test our model in SPAs in which we introduce a parameter that changes
the expected payoff as a function of one’s bid but does not affect the WDS. The
parameter multiplies realized losses by some amount β, where β = 1 is the standard
case. Consistent with previous results we find that when 0 < β ≤ 1, overbidding is
pervasive. In contrast, when we change β to 20, overbidding is significantly reduced
and underbidding is more prevalent. Overbidding when 0 < β ≤ 1 results in very few
and fairly small losses (5.8% of auctions; median loss of $0.10). This is a product
of our design: the domain of bidders’ private values is quite large relative to the
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number of bidders, so the second highest bid is almost always below the highest
value, even with overbidding. This allows us to rule out a “hot stove” type of learning
whereby losses reduce overbidding in subsequent auctions.2 Instead, it appears that
the dramatic reduction in overbidding occurs when β is exogenously and publicly
increased and can be attributed to changes in expected out-of-equilibrium payoffs.
While explanations for overbidding in various auction formats abound, and we
compare the fit of our model to several of them in Section 5, the contribution of our
model lies in its focus on the dominant strategy, adding to the recent theoretical
interest in how dominant strategies influence decision calculus in games (e.g., obvi-
ous strategy-proofness , Li 2016). Our strong findings suggest that incentives outside
equilibrium affect behavior in predictable ways in the laboratory, and probably in
the field as well, even when equilibrium analysis predicts otherwise. Goeree et al.
(2002) show a similar result in a FPAs, but in FPAs, as in many other games where
Nash equilibrium is the solution concept, best responding requires “cardinal” com-
putations. Since such computations often involve a high degree of complexity and a
heavy mental cost, we do not expect that the outcome in FPAs will exactly reflect
2The change in behavior we observe is immediate, once the β parameter changes, and more
extreme than could be plausibly predicted by learning models, as they would usually be applied
(note that little is known about learning transfer between different but very similar games, such as
the ones that result from the manipulation of β). In particular, reinforcement learning (Erev and
Roth 1998) would predict no change in behavior before subjects have a chance to experience the
new payoffs, unlike what we observe in the data. Fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine 1998) is
also unlikely to fit the data, since the overbidding we observe can not be justified by any beliefs.
Other models, such as learning direction theory (Selten and Stoecker 1986) and EWA (Camerer and
Ho 1999), consider foregone payoffs. These might predict a faster response in auctions than other
models, but its still hard to conceive how they could predict such an immediate change in bidding,
when β changes, after the subjects have already been learning for 20 or 40 periods. Steady state
concepts such as QRE (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995) are better suited to the task, e.g. predicting
the immediate tendency towards value bidding when β rises without a need for subjects to actually
experience losses. We calculate and fit such models in Section 5.
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the point prediction of Nash equilibrium. It is much less surprising to find that the
subjects’ calculations, possibly involving heuristics, approximations and simplifica-
tion rules, will be affected by a change in the incentives, even if these ought to have
no effect on Nash equilibrium. This complexity motivates many models that predict
overbidding by allowing bidders to make, and learn from, mistakes (e.g., QRE). In
an SPA with private values, however, the dominant strategy can be reached with
just “ordinal logic” of dominance, without even a need for common knowledge of
rationality.3 Thus, one would expect the solution norm— bid your value —to have
its best chance for success in this environment. Our study shows that behavior is
still guided by some degree of conscious profit maximization, but subjects’ decision
processes fail to recognize a characteristic that is very seldom present outside the
lab: the dominant strategy. Errors in recognizing a dominant strategy require a
new perspective on the cognitive processes underlying bidding behavior of the sort
provided by optimistic irrationality to try to explain “errors” made by bidders that
are as much a function of the simplicity of a dominant strategy as the complexity of
the environment.
2 Optimistically Irrational Bidders
The overlooked availability of a WDS must be the starting point of any explanation
to overbidding in SPA. We formalize the intuition behind the conjecture laid out in
3Levin, Peck and Ivanov (2016) is devoted to separating failures of “ordinal logic” (or “insight”)
from the failures of and/or biases in Bayesian updating. They use tasks involving colored cards
to measure these failures and biases, and use the measures to analyze deviations from predicted
bidding behavior in a common-value Dutch auction.
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Kagel, Harstad, and Levin (1987) by modeling an “optimistically irrational” bidder
who understands that there are possible gains and losses associated with higher bids
but who may overstate the additional probability of winning due to higher bidding
and/or understate the losses associated with it.4
Let there be n risk-neutral bidders, each of whom privately observes her value xi,
i = 1, ..., n. It is common knowledge that the xi’s are i.i.d draws from a distribution
with a cumulative density function F (t), where F ′(t) = f(t) > 0 on [0, 1], F (0) =
0, and F (1) = 1. For our purposes, we assume that the xi’s are drawn from a
generalized uniform distribution, F (t) = tα̂ and α̂ ≥ 1, where α̂ = 1 corresponds
to the uniform distribution used in almost all laboratory SPAs and FPAs. We first
make four assumptions:
Assumption 1. Symmetry
Assumption 2. Upon winning, a bidder’s gross payoff is x.
Assumption 3. Bidders believe values are i.i.d from a c.d.f. F (t) = tα with α ≥ α̂.
Assumption 4. A bidder with a value x who bids b > x and wins at a price p ∈ (x, b)
believes that the expected payment is γ(x) b+x
2
, with 0 < γ(x) ≤ 1, i.e., expected losses
are x− γ(x) b+x
2
.
The first two assumptions simply mean that each bidder believes that all other
bidders use the same, strictly monotonic bidding function, and that they receive their
4The conjecture is as follows, “Bidding in excess of x in the second-price auctions would have to
be labeled as a clear mistake, since bidding x is a dominant strategy irrespective of risk attitudes.
Bidding in excess of x is likely based on the illusion that it improves the probability of winning
with no real cost to the bidder as the second-high-bid price is paid.”(Kagel, Harstad, and Levin, p.
1299, 1-5)
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full value if they win the auction. Assumption 3 implies that a bidder potentially
overstates the impact of bidding past his value because he believes values are closer
together than they actually are. That is, he believes the increase in the probability
of winning corresponding to an increase in his bid is greater than it actually is. This
assumption finds support in other studies of auctions. For example, Cooper and
Fang (2008) found that subjects who perceive their rivals to have values similar to
their own are more likely to overbid in experimental SPAs, while Breitmoser (2015)
uses “projection,” the tendency to believe that rivals have value or beliefs similar to
one’s own, to explain the winner’s curse.5 Finally, Assumption 4 captures the notion
that a bidder in an SPA may understate possible losses when he bids above his value
and wins.
These assumptions allow us to make two important observations about an opti-
mistically irrational bidder’s maximization problem
Proposition 1. Sincere bidding, i.e., b(x) = x for all x, occurs if and only if for all
x, γ(x) = 1.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 means that an optimistically irrational bidder may still bid his
value when α = α̂ and γ(x) = 1. This does not require that the bidder recognizes
the availability of the WDS. In fact, sincere bidding only requires γ(x) = 1 but allows
α > α̂.6
5Perception of similarity in Cooper and Fang is induced by information provided to subjects
about their rivals’ values.
6When b(x) > x, the value of α will, however, affect the extent one bids above his value.
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Remark. There is a linear solution to the maximization problem with b(x; α, γ, n) =
δ(α, γ, n)x.7
Put more simply, the bid will be a multiple of the value. The exact multiple
will be a function of the number of competitors, how “close” a bidder believes those
competitors’ values are to his value, and the extent to which he understates the losses
from overbidding. In the next section we make use of the fact that there is a linear
solution to the maximization problem to inform our experimental design.
2.1 Experimental Test of the Model
Optimistically irrational bidders need not recognize the WDS but can be influenced
by “out-of-equilibrium” payoffs. Several authors have argued that, in English or
first-price auctions with private values, the exact shape of the expected payoff func-
tions matters (e.g., Harrison 1989; Goeree et al. 2002; Georganas 2011; Georganas
and Nagel 2011).8 Similarly, Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux (2004) compare value
revelation using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) method and SPAs and find
that the shape of the expected payoff function may influence behavior. They find
that the shape of the expected payoff function in the SPAs means that the probabil-
ity of winning increases faster in overbids than it decreases in underbidding, which
drives bidders who start out below the WDS towards the WDS, while overbidding
is also more costly in the SPA than in the BDM with three or more bidders. Taken
together, these observations about the shape of the expected payoff function seem
7The formal derivation can be found in the appendix.
8Our model of optimistically irrational bidders also predicts bidding above the risk-neutral Nash
equilibrium in FPAs that is affected by the shape of the expected payoff function, which we return
to in Section 5. Details can be found in the appendix.
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to reflect the assumptions we make in our model. As a simple test of optimistically
irrational bidders, we implement standard second-price, sealed-bid auctions for one
unit of an indivisible good in the laboratory. The WDS predicts that players bid
their values in equilibrium. We introduce a factor β by which we multiply eventual
negative profits of the bidders. β does not affect the equilibrium if bidders are bid-
ding sincerely because no bidder earns negative profits in equilibrium. However, the
bidders’ expected payoff functions do change, given that their opponents follow the
equilibrium strategies; in Figure 1 we plot, for different values of β, the expected
payoff function for a bidder whose rivals bid their values.
Given the remark in the previous section, we can determine how our experimental
treatments will affect the bidding of optimistically irrational bidders. Applying the
theory to our experimental treatments, when a bidder wins with b > x and loses,
his expected payment is β[x− γβ b+x2 ]. A standard SPA corresponds to the situation
where β = 1, such that the expected losses are 1 × [x − γ1 b+x2 ]. This allows us to
define γβ as a function of γ in a standard auction, i.e., γ1, which we do by setting
[x− γ1 b+x2 ] = β[x− γβ b+x2 ], and solving for γβ. Doing this, we get
γβ =
β − 1
β
2x
b+ x
+
γ1
β
(1)
We can substitute b(x) = δx into equation (1) to obtain
γβ =
1
β
[
2(β − 1)
δ + 1
+ γ1] (2)
9
Plugging equation (2) into the linear solution, we solve the problem numerically.9
The results can be found in Table 1. Assuming α = 1.1 and γ1 = 0.95, i.e., a bidder
slightly overstates the increase in his probability of winning associated with a higher
bid and slightly understates his expected loss, the model predicts that δ∗ increases
monotonically in β and bidding above value that ranges from 9.7% above value for
a β = 0.1 to 0.5% above value for a β = 20. These numerical estimates yield three
testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Subjects will overbid on average
Hypothesis 2. Subjects will overbid by more on average when β < 1 than when
β = 1
Hypothesis 3. Subjects will overbid by less on average when β > 1 than when β = 1
3 Experimental Details
The data come from nine experimental sessions conducted at Ohio State Univer-
sity. Students were recruited via e-mail and sessions took place in the Experimental
Economics Lab. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). In every session, subjects participated in 62 second-
price, sealed-bid auctions—2 trial auctions followed by 60 paying auctions—with
9The linear solution can be found in the appendix.
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either three or six bidders per auction. Subjects were randomly and anonymously
re-matched between auction periods.10 At the beginning of each auction, subjects
privately observed their own independent private values denominated in an exper-
imental currency unit (ECU), but they did not observe the values of others. All
values were drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 100], which was
common knowledge. At the end of each period the bidder who obtained the item
was informed of the price and his profit, while bidders who did not obtain the item
received no information about the price or the bids of others. The instructions can
be found in the appendix.
We multiplied negative profits by a parameter, β, which took on three values in
every session: 1, 0.1, and 20. Beta took on one of these values for periods 1-19,
another for periods 20-39, and the final value for periods 40-60. Subjects knew the
value of β, that it is the same for all bidders, and that they would be made aware
when it changed; subjects did not know when β would change, how many times it
would change, or what its magnitude would be. All subjects were given starting
balances of 150 ECUs to cover the possibility of losses. Profits and losses were added
to this balance and the balance was paid at the end of each session. We ran two
sessions with 3 bidder auctions and a β order of 1, 0.1, 20 (β31/0.1/20), two sessions
with 6 bidder auctions and a β order of 1, 0.1, 20 (β61/0.1/20), two sessions with 3
bidder auctions and a β order of 1, 20, 0.1 (β31/20/0.1), and three sessions with 3
bidder auctions and a β order of 20, 1, 0.1 (β320/1/0.1). In sessions with three bidder
auctions, the exchange rate was $1=20 ECU, while the exchange rate in sessions
10Sessions had between 12 and 24 subjects each.
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with six bidder auctions was $1=14 ECU. The exchange rates were different in order
to equalize the expected payoff between sessions with different group sizes. In the
event that a player went bankrupt, they were no longer permitted to bid and were
paid a participation fee of $8. Due to the uneven numbers after a bankruptcy, at the
beginning of every period after a bankruptcy two subjects were randomly assigned
to sit out that period in 3 bidder auctions, while five subjects were chosen to sit
out in 6 bidder auctions. In the six sessions that started with β = 1, there were
two bankruptcies; in the three sessions that started with β = 20 there were 10
bankruptcies, with all but one occurring in the first 10 periods. Complete session
details can be found in Table 2.
4 Results
Average differences between values and bids can be found in Table 3, and Figures
2-6 compare subjects’ bids and their values. Consistent previous research, we see
overbidding on average in every treatment for every value of β. To test whether or
not this overbidding is significantly different from 0, we calculated the mean difference
between bid and private value for each session within a β regime, i.e., the block of
periods during which β remained the same. Using these means as our measure of
overbidding, average overbidding is significantly greater than 0 at the 5% level in
every case except for β = 20 for β31/0.1/20 (t-test p = 0.174) and β
6
1/0.1/20 (t-test
p = 0.129).
Observation 1. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, subjects overbid on average for all
12
values of β.
The effects of changes in β are visible and drastic, in contrast to the standard
theoretical prediction of no change at all. For example, when we reduce the punish-
ment for negative outcomes from β = 1 to β = 0.1 in period 20 of β31/0.1/20, there
is an immediate effect as the average difference between bid and value more than
doubles from approximately 2.8 to 7.5— an increase equal to approximately 5% of
the support of values. When β rises to 20 in period 40 and punishment for negative
outcomes is severe, the overbidding largely disappears, with average overbids falling
from 7.5 to 1.1. Similar patterns emerge in all treatments, and the differences in
overbidding across β regimes are significant.11,12
Observation 2. Consistent with Hypotheses 2 and 3, overbidding varies significantly
across different values of β, with higher levels of β leading to less overbidding.
Our specific design allows for an additional important and interesting observation
about learning. There is significant overbidding in the first 40 periods with β = 1
and β = 0.1 in β31/0.1/20 and β
6
1/0.1/20 , and we do not observe learning in the direction
of value bidding in these periods.13 Nonetheless, there is a drastic reduction of
11To compare overbidding, we conducted Wilcoxon signed rank tests on the session means we
calculated for the various β regimes. In pairwise tests of each value of β for all treatments, all
differences were significant at the 5% level or better except for β = 1 versus β = 0.1 for β31/20/0.1(p =
0.454).
12Merlob, Plott, and Zhang (2012) compare auction designs used for Medicare and Medicaid
procurement auctions. In auction designs that allow for costless reneging, which is similar to
bidding in an auction with β < 1, they also find overbidding.
13We divide those periods for which β = 0.1 in these treatments, i.e., periods 20-39, into 4 blocks
of 5 periods each. We then calculated session specific mean overbidding for each block. The means
of these means for the blocks are 2.18, 2.40, 2.83, and 4.60, respectively. Although the means
are increasing, pairwise Wilcoxon signed rank tests of these means reveal no significant differences
between any of the first three blocks, while the last block is significantly different from all the others
but further from the WDS.
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overbidding in period 40. One possible explanation for the decline in overbidding in
period 40 is that subjects who have overbid in earlier periods are chastened by losing
money, a sort of “hot stove” learning. The evidence in Table 4 does not support this
explanation. Before β increases to 20, few auctions result in realized losses. They
range from a minimum of 4.3% of auctions for the case with six bidders when β = 1,
to 9.3% with three bidders and β = 0.1. The average loss is also quite small, ranging
from 1.1 ECUs with six bidders and β = 0.1, to 10.8 ECUs with six bidders and
β = 1. Moreover, this small and infrequent negative feedback for the first two levels
of β appears to have no effect on those who experience it. Of the 31 bidders who lose
money when β = 1, 29 also lose money when β = 0.1. Of the six bidders who lost
money when β = 20, 5 lost money at all three levels of β and the sixth lost money
when β = 0.1.
Observation 3. Reductions in overbidding when β is increased are not caused by
learning due to previous losses.
In order to move beyond unconditional means and investigate the effects of β
while allowing for individual heterogeneity, we estimate a random effects Tobit model,
regressing the difference between subject i’s bid and his value in auction j on dummies
for each β regime.14
The results in columns 1-4 of Table 5 are similar to the means in Table 3. In every
treatment bids are significantly higher when β = 0.1 than when β = 1; similarly,
bidding is significantly lower in every treatment when β = 20 than when β = 1. We
do, however, see some differences across treatments, and we reject the null hypothesis
14In the experiment, subjects could not bid more than 100, which can be seen in the groups of
bids clustered at 100 in Figures 3 and 4. We use a Tobit model to account for the censoring of bids.
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that the marginal effects of Dβ=0.1 and Dβ=20 are jointly equal across all treatments
(Wald test, p = 0.000 for both).
Although learning due to negative reinforcement is unlikely in β31/0.1/20 and β
6
1/0.1/20,
one possible explanation for the differences across treatments we observe may be
some other sort of learning or experience. To address this possibility, we augment
the model in columns 5-8 with a linear time trend and its interaction with the β
regime. We observe small, but statistically significant increases in bids over time in
the first 20 periods in treatments β61/0.1/20, β
3
1/20/0.1, and β
3
20/1/0.1, where bids increase
by roughly 0.12 to 0.18 ECUs per period; we see no significant changes over time in
subsequent periods. With the inclusion of the time trend, the same pattern emerges:
greater overbidding when β = 0.1 and less overbidding when β = 20, though the
treatment effects are no longer significant in β31/20/0.1. Allowing for changes to bid-
ding behavior over time, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the marginal
effects of Dβ=0.1 and Dβ=20 are the same across all treatments (Wald tests, p = 0.551
and p = 0.318, respectively); we find no significant differences at conventional levels
across treatments in pair-wise comparisons of Dβ=0.1 and Dβ=20.
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Observation 4. The effects of changes in β are robust to controls for individual
differences and learning over time.
15The only pairwise comparisons with p-values less than 0.2 are comparisons of Dβ=20 in
β31/20/0.1with all other treatments.
16One possible motivation for overbidding not found in Table 4 is spite. Cooper and Fang (2008)
find that overbidding can be attributed to both a heightened sense of competition for those with
high values, and spiteful behavior by those with low values. We see little evidence of spite. In results
available from the authors, we ran the same models as in columns 5-8 but restricted observations
to only those with values in the top 75% or the bottom 25% of the support of values. The results
for either sample are similar to those in table 5. Moreover, among bids between 95 and 100, only
12 of 867 bids come from bidders with values in the bottom quarter of the support.
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The linear trend presupposes that the effect of all periods is the same within a
β regime, however Figure 2 suggests that the first few periods in a session might be
slightly different.17 In columns 9-12 we estimate the same model as in columns 5-8
but exclude the first 3 periods in each session. After excluding the first three periods,
there is no significant learning over time for any value of β in any treatment.
Observation 5. Bidding behavior evolves substantially in the first few periods of a
session, but little thereafter.
5 Alternative models
One important test of our model of optimistically irrational bidders is how well it
fits the data relative to existing models. Among our candidate models, we begin by
considering a symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE) with normally distributed errors,
given that without errors the SNE fails completely to predict the change in bidding
when we shift β. Models that take all payoffs into account, even if they are not on the
equilibrium path, are good candidates to explain our results. Perhaps the simplest
way to consider all payoffs is to use the Nash model but assume that subjects’ errors
depend on the expected utility of each action in a systematic way. We do this by
considering an SNE with a logistic error structure, as in Crawford and Iriberri (2007).
Finally, we consider is quantal response equilibrium (QRE), which also makes explicit
use of the payoff function shapes, by positing that players choose an action with a
17All sessions began with either β = 1 or β = 20, so the relevant data are the first few data
points in the first and third panels of Figure 2. Similar to Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux (2004),
we observe bidding below the WDS at first before bids rapidly increase.
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probability proportional to its expected payoff.18 In preliminary comparisons, we
find that the SNE+normal model outperforms the other two models in all but one
β-number of bidder combinations.19 The reason is that, under a logit error structure,
a high frequency of underbidding is predicted for intermediate private values, since
the expected payoffs are quite flat to the left of the maximum (as seen in Figure 1);
yet we see far more overbidding than underbidding in all cases.20 QRE improves on
the Nash model with logistic errors, but still performs worse than the Nash model
with normal errors.
One way to account for the fact that we observe much more overbidding than
underbidding is to allow bidders to experience joy-of-winning (JOW). JOW can be
incorporated by adding an extra fixed utility, Ui, to the payoff of subject i, condi-
tional on winning the auction.21 It is easy to show that with such modification a
18Another possible model that we do not consider is a level-k model of the sort used to explain
auction results in Crawford and Iriberri (2007). This model predicts neither overbidding nor reaction
to different values of β, even allowing symmetric errors. In such a model, players of level one or
higher are characterized by different beliefs, but they all best respond to these beliefs. Since bidding
one’s value is a weakly dominant strategy in a SPA and does not depend on a player’s beliefs (or
risk attitudes), players of all levels are predicted to bid their values, as in any Nash equilibrium.
19Table A1 in the appendix provides the details of the comparison of fits among all alternative
models we consider.
20For example, for a value of 50 and β = 0.1 we should see approximately the same amount of
underbidding as overbidding, which is clearly not the case.
21Note that JOW looks superficially similar to spiteful behavior (e.g., Andreoni et al. 2007,
Cooper and Fang 2008). The difference is that a subject experiences JOW only in the case where
she wins, while a subject exhibits spite even if she does not win but in cases where she raises the
price for other bidders. In Cooper and Fang’s experiment, for example, subjects can sometimes
acquire information about their rival’s value. They find that, when subjects know that their value
is close to their rival’s, overbidding is more likely to result in a costly loss and subjects overbid by
less. Conversely, when subjects know that their value is well below their rival’s, hence overbidding
is unlikely to result in winning the auction but can raise the price for their rival, overbids are larger.
This is not dissimilar to our manipulation of β, and Cooper and Fang suggest that this behavior
is consistent with a modified JOW/spite model. Even the modified model cannot help explain the
difference between SPAs and English auctions, and Figures 3, 4, and 5 reveal that the constant
overbidding predicted by JOW is more plausible than spite in our data, so we consider only JOW.
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new dominant solution emerges, with bi(xi) =
Ui
β
+ xi.
22 This implication helps as
it predicts that players who enjoy winning will overbid with respect to the Nash
equilibrium and the amount of overbidding will depend inversely on β. The JOW
parameter j is found to be positive and yields a significantly higher likelihood in
every case. Nonetheless, SNE with normal errors still provides the best fit among
JOW models.
To evaluate its broad applicability, in Table 6 we examine how well the SNE
models with normal errors, both with and without JOW, fare against our model
of optimistically irrational (MI) bidders in SPAs, English auctions, and FPAs, by
comparing estimated log-likelihoods.23,24 We find that our model fares better than
the SNE with just normal errors (but no JOW) in all auctions. On the other hand, the
SNE with normal errors and JOW outperforms our model in every auction. The SNE
with normal errors and JOW may have slight advantages by the measure of Table 6,
but these advantages do not reveal the full story. In Table 7 we break out the fit by the
number of bidders and values of β. In this case, the SNE fares better than MI in six of
the nine β-number of bidder combinations. In Table 8, we compare the the predicted
mean overbidding by optimistically irrational bidders and the SNE with JOW to the
observed mean overbidding. In 4 out of the 7 cases, the magnitude of overbids by MI
22Details are provided in the appendix.
23The English auction data come from Georganas (2011), and the FPA data come from Dyer et
al. (1989).
24The derivation of optimistic irrationality for FPAs can be found in the appendix. The impli-
cations of optimistic irrationality for bidding in English auctions are much more straightforward.
Assumption 4 of the model lays out the bidder’s beliefs about expected payments and losses if he
wins at a price greater than his value, but there is no uncertainty over payments or losses in the
English auction, so beliefs should be perfectly accurate, leading even an optimistically irrational
bidder to bid his value.
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bidders is closer to the predicted overbidding than SNE bidders who experience JOW.
While on a strictly econometric basis, SNE+JOW seems to be performing slightly
better than MI, MI outperforms SNE+JOW in several instances.25 Moreover, there
are good qualitative reasons not to be satisfied with JOW, chief among them its
failure to explain why JOW occurs in SPAs but not in the strategically analogous
English auction. Ultimately, further work and additional data will be needed to
completely analyze the relative strengths of the two models.
6 Conclusions
Experiments consistently find that in second-price, sealed-bid auctions with private
values— a mechanism with incomplete information where bidding one’s value is a
WDS — subjects deviate significantly from the WDS. The availability of a “domi-
nant” action that is best irrespective of the other features of the decision is rare in
games with incomplete information and in strategic situations outside the lab. The
behavior of a bidder in a second-price auction who fails to recognize or discover such
an available strategy is still likely to be guided by rules that are useful in a wide range
of situations, such as cost-benefit analysis. Subjects in our SPAs provide support
for this characterization of bidders: their bidding is reasonable if not optimal. Sub-
jects overbid on average but their overbidding is influenced by manipulations which
affect expected payoffs out of equilibrium but not the dominant strategy. In accor-
dance with lessons learned in more familiar settings, as we vary the magnitude of
25Although we do not include the SNE model with normal errors and JOW in Tables 7 and 8,
MI outperforms that model in every case.
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the penalty for losses, a natural reaction is to hedge and bid lower when the penalty
is relatively larger and to be more aggressive when the penalty is relatively lower.
The behavioral changes may not be optimal in a second-price auction, yet they are
sensible when viewed through the lens of their applicability in richer environments.
We propose a model of optimistically irrational bidders who fail to recognize the
availability of a dominant strategy. Bidders in this model understand that raising
their bid increases the probability of winning but may either overstate the increase in
the likelihood of winning and/or fail to appreciate the costs associated with increasing
their bids. We fit several existing models designed to explain overbidding using our
data, but we find that most of these models perform poorly even when they consider
out-of-equilibrium payoffs that would be affected by our experimental manipulation,
and none of the models outperform ours consistently.
Our results build on the cautiously optimistic findings in Cooper and Fang (2008).
They find that bounded rationality—more than non-standard preferences like spite
and JOW—contributes to overbidding in SPAs. Subjects in their experiment could
purchase costly and noisy information about rivals’ values, information which does
not affect the WDS. Subjects who purchase the information were significantly more
likely to overbid, but the behavior of those subjects who did not purchase informa-
tion was consistent with theoretical predictions. They conclude by noting that this
heterogeneity may be of less significance outside the lab where selection might weed
out the irrational bidders, leaving only rational bidders. Our finding of large and the-
oretically unpredicted responses to our treatments can inform mechanism designers,
theorists and practitioners who are concerned that such selection may be insuffi-
20
cient or too slow: even in cases with a dominant strategy, the nature of incentives
outside equilibrium can influence behavior. In instances where the common sense
implications of manipulating out-of-equilibrium incentives can steer behavior toward
the desired norm, such as in SPAs, designers may be able to use these incentives to
design more stable and efficient mechanisms.26
26While our results are most applicable to situations with a dominant strategy, the fundamental
intuition behind optimistically irrational bidders may be useful in other domains, as well. For ex-
ample, over investment is common in experimental contests (Dechenaux, Kovenock, and Sheremeta
2015) that test models of RD competitions. Optimistically irrational competitors may overestimate
the increase in the likelihood of winning an RD contest and/or underestimate just how costly their
effort may be.
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Figure 1: Expected payoff functions in a second price auction with 3 bidders, for the three
different values of β. There are 5 curves in every panel which represent expected utility,
depending on one’s bid for a private value v = 0, 25, 50, 75 and 100.
22
Figure 2: Mean difference between bids and private values over time in all treatments
23
Figure 3: Scatter plot of values versus bids in all treatments when β = 1
24
Figure 4: Scatter plot of values versus bids in all treatments when β = 0.1
25
Figure 5: Scatter plot of values versus bids in all treatments when β = 20
26
Table 1: Numerical estimates of parameters for optimistically irrational bidders in auctions
with 3 bidders
β
0.10 0.20 0.50 1 2 10 20
δ 1.0965 1.0889 1.0715 1.053 1.0352 1.0093 1.0048
γβ 0.9141 0.9202 0.9345 0.9500 0.9664 0.9909 0.9952
Note: The numerical solution was found using fzero in Matlab, assuming α = 1.1
and γ1 = 0.95. The highlighted values of β correspond to the values used in the
experiment.
Table 2: Summary of sessions
Treatment Sessions Bidders Ex. Rate Subjects β order Subject-Auctions
β31/0.1/20 2 3 14 24 1, 0.1, 20 1398
β61/0.1/20 2 6 20 42 1, 0.1, 20 2519
β31/20/0.1 2 3 14 33 1, 20, 0.1 1898
β320/1/0.1 3 3 14 51 20, 1, 0.1 1685
27
Table 3: Mean difference between bid and value by treatment
β = 1 β = 0.1 β = 20 Bidders β order
2.79 7.46 1.07 3 1, 0.1, 20
(6.75) (13.67) (5.61)
4.07 7.54 0.43 6 1, 0.1, 20
(10.26) (12.96) (4.60)
4.04 4.62 2.32 3 1, 20, 0.1
(10.64) (9.94) (5.72)
2.37 5.64 1.13 3 20, 1, 0.1
(7.04) (10.61) (9.08)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 4: Subjects experiencing losses with β order 1, 0.1, 20
Three Bidders β = 1 β = 0.1 β = 20
Fraction of Auctions Resulting in Losses 5.4% 9.3% 0.6%
Mean Loss (in ECUs) 9.9 1.5 206.7
Median Loss (in ECUs) 6.0 1.0 140.0
Maximum Loss (in ECUs) 43.0 8.0 400.0
Number of Subjects Who Experience a Loss 11 14 2
Six Bidders β = 1 β = 0.1 β = 20
Fraction of Auctions Resulting in Losses 4.3% 7.1% 0.4%
Mean Loss (in ECUs) 10.8 1.6 65.0
Median Loss (in ECUs) 6.5 1.1 30.0
Maximum Loss (in ECUs) 88.0 8.8 180.0
Number of Subjects Who Experience a Loss 20 27 4
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A Appendix
A.1 Second Price Auctions
The maximization problem of an optimistically irrational bidder in an SPA in our
model is:
max
b≥0
[σ(b)]α(n−1){x − [ [σ(x)]α(n−1)
[σ(b)]α(n−1) ]θn(x) + [
[σ(b)]α(n−1)−[σ(x)]α(n−1)
[σ(b)]α(n−1) ]γ(x)
b+x
2
]},
where θn(x) denotes the expected price if a bidder wins at a price below his value
and σ(b) denotes the inverse bidding function.
The first-order condition (FOC) for the maximization problem is:
2xα(n− 1)[σ(b)]α(n−1)−1σ′(b)− γ(x)α(n− 1)[σ(b)]α(n−1)−1σ′(b)(b+ x)
−γ(x)[[σ(b)]α(n−1) − [σ(x)]α(n−1)] = 0
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After simplifying we have:
2xα(n− 1)[σ(b)]α(n−1)−1[1− γ(x)]σ′(b)− γ(x)α(n− 1)[σ(b)]α(n−1)−1(b− x)σ′(b)
−γ(x)[[σ(b)]α(n−1) − [σ(x)]α(n−1)] = 0
(A.1)
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Assume that ∀x ∈ [0, 1], b(x) = x. In such a case equation (A.1) becomes
2xα(n− 1)[σ(b)]α(n−1)−1(1− γ(x)) = 0
implying γ(x) = 1, for all x > 0, as σ′(b) = 1 with b(x) := x.
Assume that ∀x ∈ [0, 1], γ(x) := 1. In such a case equation (A.1) becomes
−{[α(n−1)σ(b)]α(n−1)−1(b−x)σ′(b)+[[σ(b)]α(n−1)−[σ(x)]α(n−1)]} Q 0 as b(x) T x.
Derivation of remark 1
Consider the FOC in equation (A.1). Recognizing that at the solution σ(b) = x
and σ′(b) = 1
b′(x) , and simplifying, we can rewrite (A.1) as
2α(n− 1)[1− γ(x)]− γ(x)α(n− 1)( b
x
− 1)− γ(x)b′(x)[1− (σ(x)
x
)
α(n−1)
] = 0. (A.2)
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Assume that ∀x ∈ [0, 1], γ(x) = γ < 1 and b(x) = δx, with δ ≥ 1. Equation
(A.2) can be written as:
2α(n− 1)[1− γ]− γα(n− 1)(δ − 1)− γδ[1− (1
δ
)
α(n−1)
] = 0 (A.3)
When δ = 1 then (A.3) becomes 2α(n − 1)[1 − γ] > 0 when γ < 1, which is the
case for overbidding.
By inspecting (A.3), it is clear that the LHS is strictly declining in δ, so that
there is a unique δ∗ that solves
2α(n− 1)[1− γ]− γα(n− 1)(δ∗ − 1)− γδ∗[1− ( 1
δ∗
)
α(n−1)
] = 0 (A.4)
A.2 First Price Auctions
The maximization problem of an optimistically irrational bidder in an FPA:
max
B≥0
[σ(B)]α(n−1)[x−B] (A.5)
Denote the solution to (??) by B(x;α) and the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium by
B(x; α̂). It is well known that the solution to (5) is given by,
B(x;α) = x−
∫ x
0 t
α(n−1)dt
xα(n−1) = x− xα(n−1)+1 = α(n−1)α(n−1)+1x
Proposition 2. B(x;α) ≥ B(x; α̂) as α ≥ α̂.
Proof. The proof is immediate.
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Thus, optimistically irrational bidders will bid above the RNNE but below their
value.
A.3 Joy of Winning
Lemma 3. In a second price auction where negative payoffs are multiplied times β
and bidders have a heterogeneous joy of winning Ui, the dominant strategy equilibrium
is bi(xi) =
Ui
β
+ xi.
Proof. Expected profits in the auctions are Πi = prob{bi > max(b−i)}(xi + Ui −
E[max(b−i)|bi > max(b−i)]), and subjects choose a bi(xi) to maximize Πi. Consider
bidding b0 < bi(xi) =
Ui
β
+ xi, when it matters i.e. you win with bi(xi) but lose
with b0. It also means that the price the winner pays is p ∈ [b0, bi(xi)]. If p > xi,
winning earns Ui − β(p − xi) ≥ Ui − β((Uiβ + xi) − xi) = 0. When p ≤ xi, strict
positive payoffs are assured. With a similar step we show that bidding bi(xi), weakly
dominates bidding b0 > bi(xi).
A.4 Examining the consistency of joy of winning
The fit of the SNE and the behavioral models is improved when we allow for joy of
winning. But is joy of winning a consistent explanation across all different values of
β that we have used in the experiments? As we have seen, joy of winning gives a
clear prediction for every β. A person who understands the dominant strategy but
has joy of winning j, will overbid by exactly j when β = 1 but will overbid by 10j
when β = 0.1. On the other hand she has to overbid by only j/20 when β = 20. In
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following Figure 6 we examine if individual players’ behavior is consistent with this
model.27
Figure 6: Consistency of the joy of winning hypothesis for each individual across the three
values of β.
Every dot is a single observation, plotting the average overbidding of a player for
two different values of β. In the left panel for example, we have mean overbidding
when β = 1 in the x axis and mean overbidding when β = 0.1 in the y axis. According
to the theory all observations should lie on a straight line through the origin with
slope βx/βy. What we see is that many observations lie on or close to the line.
However there are still some observations, especially in the second and third panel
that lie far away from this line. This indicates that although heterogeneous joy of
winning could at first sight partly explain overbidding in second price auctions, it is
not a fully consistent explanation.
27The bidding results of the 3 bidder and 6 bidder case are pooled, as the number of bidders
makes no difference for the overbidding predicted by the joy of winning model.
40
T
a
b
le
A
.1
:
M
o
d
el
fi
t
in
al
l
tr
ea
tm
en
ts
w
it
h
β
or
d
er
1,
0.
1,
20
.
S
N
E
d
en
ot
es
th
e
sy
m
m
et
ri
c
N
a
sh
eq
u
il
ib
ri
u
m
.
-L
L
is
th
e
n
eg
at
iv
e
lo
g
li
ke
li
h
o
o
d
,
B
IC
th
e
B
ay
es
ia
n
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
C
ri
te
ri
on
.
N
ot
e
a
le
ve
l
k
m
o
d
el
is
th
e
sa
m
e
is
th
e
S
N
E
.
3
b
id
d
e
r
s
(1
2
7
8
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s)
S
N
E
(n
o
r
m
)
S
N
E
+
jo
y
(n
o
r
m
)
S
N
E
(l
o
g
it
)
S
N
E
(l
o
g
it
+
jo
y
)
Q
R
E
Q
R
E
+
jo
y
-L
L
4
8
6
1
.4
4
7
2
9
.1
4
9
8
4
.7
4
9
4
4
.9
4
9
5
9
.8
4
8
3
8
B
IC
9
7
2
3
.9
9
4
7
2
.5
9
9
7
6
.6
9
9
0
4
.1
9
9
2
6
.8
9
6
9
0
.3
p
a
ra
m
et
er
s
1
0
.8
6
σ
=
9
.6
6
,j
=
0
.7
7
λ
=
0
.5
2
λ
=
0
.6
8
,j
=
2
.4
λ
=
0
.5
4
λ
=
0
.7
1
,j
=
5
.8
6
b
id
d
e
r
s
(2
3
1
0
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s)
-L
L
8
8
2
5
.1
8
5
9
3
.2
9
2
1
2
9
0
5
7
.9
9
0
8
4
8
8
5
0
.9
B
IC
1
7
6
5
8
1
7
2
0
1
1
8
4
3
2
1
8
1
3
1
1
8
1
7
6
1
7
7
1
7
p
a
ra
m
et
er
s
1
1
.0
6
σ
=
1
0
,j
=
0
.7
8
λ
=
0
.8
1
λ
=
1
.6
,
j
=
2
.2
λ
=
0
.8
3
λ
=
1
.0
8
,
j
=
6
.3
A
.5
G
o
o
d
n
e
ss
o
f
fi
t
41
